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Abstract
This work explores a sequential decision making problem with agents having diverse expertise and mismatched
beliefs. We consider an N -agent sequential binary hypothesis test in which each agent sequentially makes a decision
based not only on a private observation, but also on previous agents’ decisions. In addition, the agents have their own
beliefs instead of the true prior, and have varying expertise in terms of the noise variance in the private signal. We
focus on the risk of the last-acting agent, where precedent agents are selfish. Thus, we call this advisor(s)-advisee
sequential decision making.
We first derive the optimal decision rule by recursive belief update and conclude, counterintuitively, that beliefs
deviating from the true prior could be optimal in this setting. The impact of diverse noise levels (which means diverse
expertise levels) in the two-agent case is also considered and the analytical properties of the optimal belief curves
are given. These curves, for certain cases, resemble probability weighting functions from cumulative prospect theory,
and so we also discuss the choice of Prelec weighting functions as an approximation for the optimal beliefs, and
the possible psychophysical optimality of human beliefs. Next, we consider an advisor selection problem wherein
the advisee of a certain belief chooses an advisor from a set of candidates with varying beliefs. We characterize the
decision region for choosing such an advisor and argue that an advisee with beliefs varying from the true prior often
ends up selecting a suboptimal advisor, indicating the need for a social planner. We close with a discussion on the
implications of the study toward designing artificial intelligence systems for augmenting human intelligence.
Index Terms
social learning, sequential binary hypothesis test, cumulative prospect theory, augmented intelligence
I. INTRODUCTION
Team decision making typically involves individual decisions that are influenced by private observations and the
opinions of the rest of the team. The social learning setting is one such context where decisions of individual
agents are influenced by preceding agents in the team [3], [4]. We consider the setting in which individual agents
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2are selfish and aim to minimize their perceived Bayes risk, according to their beliefs as reinforced by the decisions
of preceding agents. Social learning, also referred to as observational learning, has been widely studied and we
provide a non-exhaustive listing of some of the relevant works.
Aspects of conformism and “herding” were studied in [5]–[7], where an incorrect decision may cascade for the
rest of the agents once agents at the beginning make incorrect decisions. The concept of herding is a consequence
of boundedly informative private signals [8]. For example, assume the private signals are binary and give true or
false information, each with positive probability. It can happen that a couple of the first agents receive false private
signals and thus choose wrong actions. Then, the effect of these actions on the beliefs of subsequent agents can
be so great as to cause them to ignore their private signals and follow their precedent agents. The private signals
are bounded so that they are not strong enough to overcome the effect of the wrong actions. Further convergence
properties of actions taken under social learning have been explored under imperfect information [9]. The notion
of sequential social learning has been generalized to learning from neighbors in networks [10], and explored in
generality [11]. Social learning has also been explored under quantization of priors [12], and distributed detection
with symmetric fusion [13].
This paper differs from the literature in the sense that we consider unbounded private signals so that there is
no herding behavior. In addition, we focus largely on the effects of prior probability and private signal strength.
Unlike sequential decision making [14] where all agents know the true prior, we assume agents may have beliefs
that do not match the true prior. Further, private signal strengths of agents could be different, i.e., noise variances
are not necessarily identical, which translates to varying expertise. The decision making of individual agents is also
different in that the agents perform locally Bayes optimal decisions, i.e., decisions that minimize their individual
Bayes risk. This is different from the context of collectively optimizing the team’s risk [13] or decision making
that maximizes a personal reward [15].
We study a sequential binary hypothesis test in the social learning framework, termed social teaching, and
characterize optimal beliefs of agents that minimize the Bayes risk of the last-acting agent. As such, we often refer
to agents as advisor(s)-advisee, where the advisee is the last-acting agent. In general, it counterintuitively turns out
that agents using beliefs that do not match the true prior are optimal, i.e., each agent has a perceived belief of the
prior. For instance, in the two-agent system with equal expertise levels, the optimal advisor in the social teaching
context is one who is open-minded, i.e., overweights the belief for small prior, and underweights when it is large.
On the other hand, the corresponding optimal advisee is one who is closed-minded and behaves in the opposite
way to the advisor. We describe analytical characteristics of the optimal beliefs and also show how the nature of
such behaviors of agents change when expertise levels differ (which is characterized by the observational noise in
the private signals).
We are ultimately interested in the Bayes risk of the advisee (i.e., the last-acting agent), and thus it is important that
the advisee uses the correct set of advisors for the task. To this end, we consider team selection for such sequential
hypothesis testing, and characterize the criterion used for advisor selection. Through this study we observe that
self-organized teams may results in suboptimal compositions, emphasizing the importance of a social planner who
is aware of the true prior.
DRAFT
3௒݂భ|ு ௒݂ಿ|ு௒݂మ|ு
ܪ ∈ ሼ0,1ሽ
ଵܻ ଶܻ ேܻ
Alexis Blake Norah
ܪ෡ଵ ܪ෡ேିଵܪ෡ଶ
Fig. 1: A sequential decision making model with N agents.
Human actions are typically affected by individual perceptions of the underlying context. Cumulative prospect
theory [16]–[18] seeks to provide a psychological understanding of human behaviors under risk. It introduces the
notion of probability reweighting functions to explain boundedly rational human behaviors. Among reweighting
functions, the Prelec reweighting function [19] has significant empirical support and satisfies a majority of the
axioms of prospect theory. Interestingly, the Prelec function spans a class of open- and closed-minded beliefs, that
are observed to be optimal in certain cases of social teaching, and hence one might expect these human cognitive
biases to emerge as the information-theoretically optimal choices for social learning. However, we discuss that it
does not capture all behavioral patterns for optimal beliefs of agents in the case of diverse expertise levels.
In the era of AI (Artificial Intelligence or Augmented Intelligence), a sequential decision making model captures
the nature of collaboration in human-AI teams with either the AI system advising the human who makes the final
decision or less typically a human advising an AI system that makes the final decision [20, p. 56]. Examples of
this kind include AI-assisted physicians or chess players (called centaur chess), and of the second kind, human-in-
the-loop AI systems such as crowdsourcing systems and collaborative filtering mechanisms. Our work shows the
interesting conclusion that a team of suboptimal human-AI could beat the team of individually optimal human-AI,
if it is well-composed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec. II describes the sequential binary hypothesis testing problem.
Sec. III proposes a recursive belief update equation that transforms the sequential decision making problem into
a single-agent decision making problem. Sec. IV shows the optimal beliefs that minimize the advisee’s risk and
Sec. V evaluates them for Gaussian likelihoods. Sec. VI considers a two-agent team construction problem. Sec. VII
concludes.
This sequential decision making problem with identical expertise agents was first presented in [1] and in particular
two-agent systems with diverse expertise were investigated in [2]. This paper integrates and generalizes our previous
results, and also, significantly improves analytic understanding on optimal beliefs in sequential decision making. In
addition, we provide a novel interpretation of Prelec-like beliefs in terms of AI-human collaboration systems.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Consider an N -agent sequential decision making problem, as illustrated in Fig. 1. The underlying hypothesis,
H ∈ {0, 1}, is a binary signal with prior PH = 0 = p0 and PH = 1 = 1−p0. There are N agents that sequentially
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4detect the state in a predetermined order. The nth agent has a private signal Yn generated according to the likelihood
fYn|H , which is not necessarily identical for all n. Let the decision made by the nth agent be Ĥn. In addition to
the private signal, the nth agent also observes the decisions made by preceding agents, {Ĥ1, . . . , Ĥn−1}, which is
referred to as the public signal and is used in the agent’s decision making.
However, the nth agent believes the prior probability of the null hypothesis is qn ∈ [0, 1] as against the true prior
probability p0. We call this the belief of the agent in order to distinguish it from the prior. Agent n is also aware
of her own likelihoods fYn|H that define her private signal. However, she also perceives the likelihoods and beliefs
of the other agents to be the same as hers, i.e., she thinks fYj |H = fYn|H , qj = qn for all j 6= n, even though they
could be different and unknown to her. We assume that the likelihood ratio of each agent is an increasing function
in y, i.e., for all agents Ln(yn) is an increasing function in yn, where
Ln(yn) :=
fYn|H(yn|1)
fYn|H(yn|0)
.
Our performance analysis focuses on the last agent (N th agent, Norah) and her decision ĤN . Upon observing her
private signal YN and the (N − 1) preceding decisions, she determines her decision rule. The relative importance
of correct decisions and errors can be abstracted as a cost function. For simplicity, we assume correct decisions
have zero cost and use the shorthand notations c10 = c(1, 0) as the cost for false alarm or Type I error (choosing
Ĥ = 1 when H = 0), and c01 = c(0, 1) as the cost for missed detection or Type II error (choosing Ĥ = 0 when
H = 1). In addition, we assume that agents have the same costs; they are a team in the sense of Radner [21]. Then
the Bayes risk is
RN = c10p0pĤN |H(1|0) + c01(1− p0)pĤN |H(0|1). (1)
As Ĥn depends on the previous decisions, the computation of (1) also depends on (Ĥ1, . . . , ĤN−1), and the Bayes
risk can be expanded as
RN =
∑
ĥ1,...,ĥN−1
c10p0pĤN ,ĤN−1,...,Ĥ1|H(1, ĥN−1, . . . , ĥ1|0) + c01(1− p0)pĤN ,ĤN−1,...,Ĥ1|H(0, ĥN−1, . . . , ĥ1|1).
(2)
We determine the optimal set of beliefs of the agents {q∗n}Nn=1 that minimize (2).
In our model, the nth agent minimizes her perceived Bayes risk, which is the Bayes risk with prior probability
p0 replaced by her belief qn. In other words, for all n = 1, . . . , N , the nth agent adopts the decision rule that
minimizes her perceived Bayes risk Rn, and her decision is revealed to other agents as a public signal. The decisions
{Ĥ1, . . . , Ĥn−1} of the earlier-acting agents reveal information about H and thus should be incorporated into the
decision-making process by agent n. As mentioned earlier, since she believes qn is the true prior, she aggregates
information under the assumption that q1 = q2 = · · · = qn.
It is important to note that every agent is selfish and rational; the agents do not adjust their decision rules for
Norah’s sake. The novelty in the model (and hence in the conclusions) comes from agent n having the limitation
of using a private initial belief qn in place of the true prior probability p0.
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prospect-theoretic models of human behavior. It spans a family of open- and closed-minded beliefs (will be discussed
later) and thus the optimal beliefs that emerge in following sections could be approximated by a function in the
Prelec family.
Definition 1 ( [19]): For α, β > 0, the Prelec reweighting function w : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1] is
w(p;α, β) = exp(−β(− log p)α).
The function satisfies several properties such as:
1) w(p;α, β) is strictly increasing;
2) has a unique fixed point w(p;α, β) = p at p∗ = exp(− exp(log β/(1− α))); and
3) spans a class of open-minded beliefs when α < 1, i.e., overweights (underweights) small (high) probability,
and vice versa when α > 1.
A more generic form, termed composite Prelec weighting function, has been defined in [22].
Throughout the paper, we use f for continuous probability density functions and p for discrete probability mass
functions. All logarithms are natural logarithms. We use N (µ, σ2) to denote a Gaussian distribution with mean µ
and variance σ2, and φ(x;µ, σ2) to denote its density function, i.e.,
φ(x;µ, σ2) =
1√
2piσ2
e−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 .
Also in the case of the standard Gaussian, φ(x) = φ(x; 0, 1) for simplicity. Q(x) is defined as the complementary
cumulative distribution function of the standard Gaussian,
Q(x) =
∫ ∞
x
φ(t)dt.
III. BELIEF UPDATE AND SEQUENTIAL DECISION MAKING
Our model assumes unbounded private signals. Thus, unlike in [5], [6], it is always possible that a subsequent
agent may not follow previous decisions; that is, herding happens with arbitrarily low probability. We now discuss
using both a decision history and private signals for Bayesian binary hypothesis testing. The decision rule can be
interpreted as each agent updating her posterior belief based on the decision history and then applying a likelihood
ratio test to her private signal.
A. Alexis, the First Agent
Since Alexis has no prior decision history, she follows usual binary hypothesis testing. She uses the following
likelihood ratio test with her prior belief q1, with ties broken arbitrarily:
L1(y1) =
fY1|H(y1|1)
fY1|H(y1|0)
Ĥ1=1
≷
Ĥ1=0
c10q1
c01(1− q1) . (3)
Since we assume the likelihood ratio is increasing in y1, the rule simplifies to comparing the private signal with
an appropriate decision threshold:
y1
Ĥ1=1
≷
Ĥ1=0
λ1(q1), (4)
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L1(λ) =
fY1|H(λ|1)
fY1|H(λ|0)
=
c10q1
c01(1− q1) . (5)
Note that in assuming Ln is monotonically increasing, there is at most one solution to (5). Then, the decision Ĥ1
made by Alexis, according to the likelihood ratio test, is revealed to other agents.
B. Blake, the Second Agent
Blake observes Alexis’s decision Ĥ1 = ĥ1 and evaluates the likelihood ratio for Ĥ1, Y2, using his prior belief q2
as
fY2,Ĥ1|H(y2, ĥ1|1)
fY2,Ĥ1|H(y2, ĥ1|0)
Ĥ2=1
≷
Ĥ2=0
c10q2
c01(1− q2) . (6)
The private signals Y1 and Y2 are independent conditioned on H , so Ĥ1 and Y2 are also independent conditioned
on H . Hence, the left side of (6) is
fY2,Ĥ1|H(y2, ĥ1|h) = fY2|H(y2|h)pĤ1|H(ĥ1|h).
So we can rewrite (6) as1
fY2|H(y2|1)
fY2|H(y2|0)
Ĥ2=1
≷
Ĥ2=0
c10q2
c01(1− q2)
pĤ1|H(ĥ1|0)[2]
pĤ1|H(ĥ1|1)[2]
. (7)
The likelihood ratio test (7) can be interpreted as Blake updating his prior belief upon observing Alexis’s decision
Ĥ1. Combined with q2, his prior belief is updated according to pĤ1|H(ĥ1|h)[2], from q2 to qA2 :
qA2
1− qA2
=
q2
1− q2
pĤ1|H(ĥ1|0)[2]
pĤ1|H(ĥ1|1)[2]
. (8)
The updated belief is
qA2 =
q2pĤ1|H(ĥ1|0)[2]
q2pĤ1|H(ĥ1|0)[2] + (1− q2)pĤ1|H(ĥ1|1)[2]
=
pĤ1,H(ĥ1, 0)[2]
pĤ1,H(ĥ1, 0)[2] + pĤ1,H(ĥ1, 1)[2]
= pH|Ĥ1(0|ĥ1)[2]. (9)
It should be noted that the true pĤ1|H(ĥ1|h) is given by
pĤ1|H(0|h) = pĤ1|H(0|h)[1] = PY1 ≤ λ1(q1)|H = h =
∫ λ1(q1)
−∞
fY1|H(y|h)dy,
pĤ1|H(1|h) =
∫ ∞
λ1(q1)
fY1|H(y|h)dy.
1The subscript [2] in the term p
Ĥ1|H(ĥ1|h)[2] indicates the value of pĤ1|H(ĥ1|h) that Blake (the second agent) thinks. We specify this
because Blake does not know Alexis’s belief q1. Thus, he interprets her decision based on his belief q2. The value is different from the true
value of p
Ĥ1|H(ĥ1|h) = pĤ1|H(ĥ1|h)[1]. Of course, it will also be different from what Chuck, the third agent, perceives, which is denoted
by p
Ĥ1|H(ĥ1|h)[3]. This will be explained in the next subsection.
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q1, fY1|H(·) respectively. Thus the probability pĤ1|H(ĥ1|h) is computed based on λ2(q2), instead of λ1(q2):
pĤ1|H(0|h)[2] =
∫ λ2(q2)
−∞
fY2|H(y|h)dy, (10a)
pĤ1|H(1|h)[2] =
∫ ∞
λ2(q2)
fY2|H(y|h)dy. (10b)
An interesting observation is that Alexis’s belief q1 does not affect Blake’s belief update as observed in (9) and
(10). That is, for any belief q1 that Alexis might hold, Blake, who does not know this belief, presumes that the
conditional probabilities are computed according to (10) and updates his belief as in (9) which depends only on
Blake’s initial belief and Alexis’s decision.
However, Alexis’s prior belief implicitly affects Blake’s performance since her biased belief changes the resulting
decisions whose probabilities are embedded in the probability of Blake’s decision:
pĤ2|H(ĥ2|h) =
∑
ĥ1∈{0,1}
pĤ2,Ĥ1|H(ĥ2, ĥ1|h)
= pĤ2|Ĥ1,H(ĥ2|0, h)[2] × pĤ1|H(0|h)[1] + pĤ2|Ĥ1,H(ĥ2|1, h)[2] × pĤ1|H(1|h)[1].
Thus, Alexis’s biased belief changes the probability of not only her decision but also of Blake’s decision.
C. Chuck, the Third Agent
Chuck’s detection process is similar to Blake’s. He observes both Alexis’s and Blake’s decisions and also updates
his prior belief q3 like in (8):
qAB3
1− qAB3
=
q3
1− q3
pĤ2,Ĥ1|H(ĥ2, ĥ1|0)[3]
pĤ2,Ĥ1|H(ĥ2, ĥ1|1)[3]
=
(
q3
1− q3
pĤ1|H(ĥ1|0)[3]
pĤ1|H(ĥ1|1)[3]
)
pĤ2|Ĥ1,H(ĥ2|ĥ1, 0)[3]
pĤ2|Ĥ1,H(ĥ2|ĥ1, 1)[3]
. (11)
Note that Ĥ1 and Ĥ2 are not conditionally independent given H as Blake’s decision Ĥ2 depends on Alexis’s
decision Ĥ1.
Chuck’s belief update can be understood as a two-step process. The first step is to update his belief according
to Alexis’s decision:
qA3
1− qA3
=
q3
1− q3
pĤ1|H(ĥ1|0)[3]
pĤ1|H(ĥ1|1)[3]
. (12)
The second step is to update it from qA3 based on Blake’s decision:
qAB3
1− qAB3
=
qA3
1− qA3
pĤ2|Ĥ1,H(ĥ2|ĥ1, 0)[3]
pĤ2|Ĥ1,H(ĥ2|ĥ1, 1)[3]
. (13)
Again, Chuck is not aware of neither Alexis’s nor Blake’s prior beliefs or likelihoods. Thus, Chuck computes all
probabilities based on his own belief q3 and likelihood fY3|H , which is indicated by the subscript [3] in (12) and
(13).
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pĤ1|H(0|h)[3] =
∫ λ3(q3)
−∞
fY3|H(y|h)dy,
pĤ1|H(1|h)[3] =
∫ ∞
λ3(q3)
fY3|H(y|h)dy.
Similar to Blake (8), Chuck computes qA3 for Ĥ1 = 0 and Ĥ1 = 1 respectively as:
q03 =
q3
q3 + (1− q3)
∫ λ3(q3)
−∞ fY3|H(y|1)dy∫ λ3(q3)
−∞ fY3|H(y|0)dy
, (14a)
q13 =
q3
q3 + (1− q3)
∫∞
λ3(q3)
fY3|H(y|1)dy∫∞
λ3(q3)
fY3|H(y|0)dy
. (14b)
Then,
pĤ2|Ĥ1,H(0|ĥ1, h)[3] =
∫ λ3(qA3 )
−∞
fY3|H(y|h)dy, (15a)
pĤ2|Ĥ1,H(1|ĥ1, h)[3] =
∫ ∞
λ3(qA3 )
fY3|H(y|h)dy. (15b)
Even though the value of ĥ1 does not appear in (15), it is implicit in qA3 and affects the computation results. Chuck’s
updated belief qAB3 is obtained by substituting (14) and (15) in (13).
D. Norah, the N th Agent
Norah, the N th agent, observes YN and {Ĥ1, . . . , ĤN−1}. Paralleling the arguments in the preceding subsections,
her prior belief update is a function of qN as well as {Ĥ1, . . . , ĤN−1}, but not of {q1, . . . , qN−1}. Generalizing
(11), we have
qAB···MN
1− qAB···MN
=
qN
1− qN
pĤ1|H(ĥ1|0)[N ]
pĤ1|H(ĥ1|1)[N ]
N−1∏
n=2
pĤn|Ĥn−1,...,Ĥ1,H(ĥn|ĥn−1, . . . , ĥ1, 0)[N ]
pĤn|Ĥn−1,...,Ĥ1,H(ĥn|ĥn−1, . . . , ĥ1, 1)[N ]
. (16)
Combining all observations, we obtain the following theorem. Define the prior belief update function, Un as
qAB···MN = UN (qN , ĥ1, ĥ2, . . . , ĥN−1).
Theorem 1: The function Un has the following recurrence relation:
• For n = 1, U1(q) = q.
• For n > 1,
Un(q, ĥ1, . . . , ĥn−2, 0) =
q˜
q˜ + (1− q˜)
∫ λN (q˜)
−∞ fYN |H(y|1)dy∫ λN (q˜)
−∞ fYN |H(y|0)dy
, (17a)
Un(q, ĥ1, . . . , ĥn−2, 1) =
q˜
q˜ + (1− q˜)
∫∞
λN (q˜)
fYN |H(y|1)dy∫∞
λN (q˜)
fYN |H(y|0)dy
, (17b)
where q˜ = Un−1(q, ĥ1, . . . , ĥn−2).
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Fig. 2: The function U4(q4, ĥ1, ĥ2, ĥ3)—updated belief of the fourth agent (qABC4 )—for each possible combination
of Alexis’s, Blake’s, and Chuck’s decisions [ĥ1, ĥ2, ĥ3] when c10 = c01 = 1 and private signals are distorted by
additive Gaussian noise with variance 1 (left panel) and 0.5 (right panel), respectively. The updated belief is mostly
dependent on Chuck’s decision; the top four curves are for ĥ3 = 0 and the bottom four curves are for ĥ3 = 1.
Fig. 2 depicts the function U4(q4, ĥ1, ĥ2, ĥ3) for N = 4 for eight possible combinations of Alexis’s, Blake’s, and
Chuck’s decisions [ĥ1, ĥ2, ĥ3]. An interesting property of Un is that the updated belief is much more dependent
on the most recent decision ĥn−1 than on the earlier decisions ĥ1, . . . , ĥn−2. This is especially the case when the
(n− 1)th agent has not followed precedent. This is because the nth agent rationally concludes that the (n− 1)th
agent observed strong evidence to justify a deviation from precedent. For example, if the decision history of the first
five agents is [0, 0, 0, 0, 1] then the sixth agent takes the last decision 1 seriously even though the first four agents
chose 0. A reversal of an arbitrarily long precedent sequence may occur because we assume unbounded private
signals; if private signals are bounded [5], [6], then the influence of the precedent can reach a point where agents
cannot receive a signal strong enough to justify a decision running counter to precedent. Another interesting point
is that smaller noise variance changes beliefs more. It is clear from (17), but also reasonable that when the variance
is smaller (i.e., agents with more expertise), the nth agent trusts and is more inclined towards previous decisions.
Note even though the prior updates of Norah in Fig. 2 do not depend on {q1, . . . , qN−1} and their corresponding
likelihoods, the probability of prior decisions depends on them and implicitly, so does Norah’s decision.
As we can see in Fig. 2, the dominant previous decision for agent n is the decision of agent (n − 1). We can
prove that observing the (n− 1)th agent’s decision 0 (or decision 1), the nth agent’s updated belief becomes larger
(or smaller), which in turn implies that the decision threshold of nth agent becomes larger (or smaller) so that she
is more likely to declare decision 0 (or 1) as well.
Theorem 2: Suppose that noises are independent and additive, and have continuous densities. Fix some prior
decisions {ĥ1, . . . , ĥn−2} and let q˜n, q˜0n, q˜1n denote the posterior beliefs of the nth agent given the n− 2 decisions
only, the n− 2 decisions and ĥn−1 = 0, and the n− 2 decisions and ĥn−1 = 1. Then,
q˜1n < q˜n < q˜
0
n.
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Proof: We know that q˜n, q˜0n, q˜
1
n differ only by the last multiplicative term of (16). Since
q
1−q is monotone
increasing, the statement is equivalent to showing:∫∞
λn(q˜n)
fYn|H(y|0)dy∫∞
λn(q˜n)
fYN |H(y|1)dy
< 1 <
∫ λn(q˜n)
−∞ fYn|H(y|0)dy∫ λn(q˜n)
−∞ fYn|H(y|1)dy
.
Since the noise is independent and additive, fYn|H(y|1) = fYn|H(y − 1|0) so the term on the left side∫∞
λn(q˜n)
fYn|H(y|0)dy∫∞
λn(q˜n)
fYN |H(y|1)dy
=
∫∞
λn(q˜n)
fYn|H(y|0)dy∫∞
λn(q˜n)−1 fYN |H(y|0)dy
=
∫∞
λn(q˜n)
fYn|H(y|0)dy∫ λn(q˜n)
λn(q˜n)−1 fYN |H(y|0)dy +
∫∞
λn(q˜n)
fYN |H(y|0)dy
< 1.
The right inequality can be shown similarly.
Considering the complicated relationships that individual decisions have on the evolution of posterior beliefs, it
is also important to verify if the posterior belief evolution preserves the ordering, given the same set of decisions.
That is, given two posterior beliefs q < q′ and the same sequence of following d decisions, then it is important
to characterize the likelihoods for which the the ordering is preserved in the resulting posterior beliefs, given the
sequence of decisions, which is described in the following theorem.
Theorem 3: Suppose that noise is independent and additive, and has a continuous density. Consider two beliefs
qL < qR. Then, for any given later-acting decisions d, updated belief satisfies qdL < q
d
R if and only if
g1(q) :=
q
1− q
∫ λn(q)
−∞ fYn|H(y|0)dy∫ λn(q)
−∞ fYn|H(y|1)dy
, (18)
g2(q) :=
q
1− q
∫∞
λn(q)
fYn|H(y|0)dy∫∞
λn(q)
fYn|H(y|1)dy
(19)
are both increasing in q.
Proof: Note that once observing decision 0, beliefs are updated as
q0L
1− q0L
=
qL
1− qL
∫ λn(qL)
−∞ fYn|H(y|0)dy∫ λn(qL)
−∞ fYn|H(y|1)dy
,
q0R
1− q0R
=
qR
1− qR
∫ λn(qR)
−∞ fYn|H(y|0)dy∫ λn(qR)
−∞ fYn|H(y|1)dy
,
so that the condition for which order q0L < q
0
R is preserved is (18). Similarly, (19) can be shown by updating after
decision 1.
Let us state some properties of Mills ratio [23], [24], which is about Gaussian distribution, and we will see that
g1(q), g2(q) are both increasing if likelihoods are Gaussian.
Lemma 1 ( [24]): Define η(x) := φ(x)/Q(x), the inverse of Mills ratio. Then, for any x ∈ R, it is true that
0 < η′(x) < 1 and η′′(x) > 0.
Corollary 1: Consider a Gaussian likelihood, i.e., Yn = H+Zn, where Zn are independent and identically drawn
from N (0, σ2), for some σ2 > 0. Then the functions g1(q), g2(q) are both increasing functions of q.
Proof: Let us consider g2(q) first. For the Gaussian hypothesis test, we know that the threshold for the likelihood
ratio test is given by
λn(q) =
1
2
+ σ2 log
(
c10q
c01(1− q)
)
.
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Then, we have
g2(q) =
q
1− q
Q
(
λn(q)
σ
)
Q
(
λn(q)−1
σ
) .
Letting x := log c10qc01(1−q) , it is sufficient to show that
g˜(x) := log
(
c10
c01
g2(q)
)
= x+ log
(
Q
(
σx+ 12σ
))− log (Q (σx− 12σ )) ,
is increasing in x since c10, c01 are positive constants, log(·) is a monotonically increasing function, and x is a
strictly increasing function of q.
The first derivative of g˜ is given by
g˜′(x) = 1− η (σx+ 12σ )+ η (σx− 12σ ) . (20)
Since η(·) is a continuous function, using the mean value theorem, there exists y ∈ (σx− 12σ , σx+ 12σ ), such that
η
(
σx+ 12σ
)− η (σx− 12σ ) = ση′(y) 1σ = η′(y). (21)
From the first property of Lem. 1, 0 < η′(y) < 1, we have
η
(
σx+ 12σ
)− η (σx− 12σ ) < 1.
Thus, from (20), it follows that g˜′(x) > 0 for all x, indicating that g˜(·) is an increasing function of x. This in turn
implies that g2(·) is also an increasing function.
To prove the result for g1, it is sufficient to observe that by the symmetry of error probabilities:
g1(q) =
1
g2(1− q) .
IV. OPTIMAL BELIEF
We described the posterior belief evolution and decision making model in Sec. III. In this section, we investigate
the set of prior beliefs that minimize the Bayes risk. We consider the case of two agents for analytical tractability
although the broad nature of the arguments extend to multi-agent systems. Note that the Bayes risk of the system
with N = 2 is the same as Blake’s Bayes risk because his decision is adopted as the final decision.
Let us recapitulate the computation of Blake’s Bayes risk. Alexis chooses her decision threshold as λ1 := λ1(q1).
Her probabilities of error are given by
P Ie,1 = pĤ1|H(1|0) =
∫ ∞
λ1
fY1|H(y|0)dy,
P IIe,1 = pĤ1|H(0|1) =
∫ λ1
−∞
fY1|H(y|1)dy.
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Blake however presumes Alexis uses the decision threshold λ1,[2] := λ2(q2) and computes her probabilities of
error accordingly2:
P Ie,1,[2] = pĤ1|H(1|0)[2] =
∫ ∞
λ1,[2]
fY2|H(y|0)dy,
P IIe,1,[2] = pĤ1|H(0|1)[2] =
∫ λ1,[2]
−∞
fY2|H(y|1)dy.
When Alexis decides Ĥ1 = 0, Blake updates his belief q2 to the posterior q02 :
q02
1− q02
=
q2
1− q2
1− P Ie,1,[2]
P IIe,1,[2]
=⇒ q02 =
q2(1− P Ie,1,[2])
q2(1− P Ie,1,[2]) + (1− q2)P IIe,1,[2]
, (22)
his decision threshold is λ02 := λ2(q
0
2), and the probabilities of error are
P I0e,2 = pĤ2|Ĥ1,H(1|0, 0) =
∫ ∞
λ02
fY2|H(y|0)dy,
P II0e,2 = pĤ2|Ĥ1,H(0|0, 1) =
∫ λ02
−∞
fY2|H(y|1)dy.
Likewise, when Alexis decides Ĥ1 = 1, Blake updates his belief q2 to the posterior q12 :
q12
1− q12
=
q2
1− q2
P Ie,1,[2]
1− P IIe,1,[2]
=⇒ q12 =
q2P
I
e,1,[2]
q2P Ie,1,[2] + (1− q2)(1− P IIe,1,[2])
, (23)
his decision threshold is λ12 = λ2(q
1
2), and the probabilities of error are
P I1e,2 = pĤ2|Ĥ1,H(1|1, 0) =
∫ ∞
λ12
fY2|H(y|0)dy,
P II1e,2 = pĤ2|Ĥ1,H(0|1, 1) =
∫ λ12
−∞
fY2|H(y|1)dy.
Now we compute the system’s Bayes risk (or Blake’s Bayes risk) R2:
R2 = c10pĤ2,H(1, 0) + c01pĤ2,H(0, 1)
= c10
∑
ĥ1∈{0,1}
pĤ2|Ĥ1,H(1|ĥ1, 0)pĤ1|H(ĥ1|0)pH(0) + c01
∑
ĥ1∈{0,1}
pĤ2|Ĥ1,H(0|ĥ1, 0)pĤ1|H(ĥ1|1)pH(1)
= c10
[
P I0e,2(1− P Ie,1) + P I1e,2P Ie,1
]
p0 + c01
[
P II0e,2P
II
e,1 + P
II1
e,2(1− P IIe,1)
]
(1− p0). (24)
Note that the Bayes risk R2 in (24) is a function of q1 and q2. One might think that R2 is minimum at q1 = q2 = p0
as Alexis makes the best decision for the true prior and Blake does not misunderstand her decision. Surprisingly,
however, this turns out to not be true. We prove this by studying Alexis’s optimal belief q∗1 that minimizes R2.
Theorem 4: Alexis’s and Blake’s optimal beliefs q∗1 , q
∗
2 that minimize R2 satisfy
q∗1
1− q∗1
=
p0(P
I1
e,2 − P I0e,2)
(1− p0)(P II0e,2 − P II1e,2)
. (25)
Before proceeding to the proof, note that error probability terms in the right-side are dependent on q2, but not
on q1. Furthermore, the value of (P I1e,2−P I0e,2)/(P II0e,2−P II1e,2) is generally not 1, i.e., in general q1 = q2 = p0 is not
2Recall that the subscript [2] denotes the quantity ‘seen by’ Blake.
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the optimal belief. For example, for the additive Gaussian noise model considered in the next section, the ratio is
not equal to 1 except when p0 = c01/(c10 + c01).
Proof: Let us consider the first derivative of (24) with respect to q1:
∂R2
∂q1
= c10p0(P
I1
e,2 − P I0e,2)
∂P Ie,1
∂q1
+ c01(1− p0)(P II0e,2 − P II1e,2)
∂P IIe,1
∂q1
.
We want to find q1 that minimizes R2, i.e., q1 makes the first derivative zero. Using
dP Ie,1
dq1
=
dP Ie,1
dλ1
dλ1
dq1
= −fY1|H(λ1|0)
dλ1
dq1
,
dP IIe,1
dq1
=
dP IIe,1
dλ1
dλ1
dq1
= fY1|H(λ1|1)
dλ1
dq1
;
this occurs when
c10p0(P
I1
e,2 − P I0e,2)fY1|H(λ1|0) = c01(1− p0)(P II0e,2 − P II1e,2)fY1|H(λ1|1)
⇐⇒ fY1|H(λ1|1)
fY1|H(λ1|0)
=
c10p0(P
I1
e,2 − P I0e,2)
c01(1− p0)(P II0e,2 − P II1e,2)
. (26)
Note that λ1 = λ1(q1) is a solution to (4),
fY1|H(λ1|1)
fY1|H(λ1|0)
=
c10q1
c01(1− q1) . (27)
Equating (26) and (27) completes the proof.
The theorem considers general continuous likelihoods {fYn|H} with the monotonicity assumption on λ(q). It is
interesting to evaluate the optimal beliefs in the case of Gaussian likelihoods (i.e., additive Gaussian noise) and
obtain insights into optimality in the sequential decision making problem.
V. GAUSSIAN LIKELIHOODS
We now focus on Gaussian likelihoods and study their optimal beliefs in this section. Suppose the nth agent
receives the signal Yn = H+Zn, where Zn is an independent additive Gaussian noise with zero mean and variance
σ2n > 0. Note that smaller noise variance implies the agent is more likely to infer correctly and so has more
expertise. Thus in this context, the received signal probability densities for H = h are
fYn|H(yn|h) = φ(yn;h, σ2n).
For a belief qn, the decision threshold is then determined by the likelihood ratio test,
Ln(yn) =
fYn|H(yn|1)
fYn|H(yn|0)
Ĥ1=1
≷
Ĥ1=0
c10qn
c01(1− qn) ,
that simplifies to the following simple threshold condition for Gaussian likelihoods:
yn
Ĥ1=1
≷
Ĥ1=0
λn(qn) =
1
2
+ σ2n log
(
c10qn
c01(1− qn)
)
. (28)
Here the index n represents the nth agent in the system, as the belief and variance of the agent varies along the
chain.
Using the recursive update in Sec. III and decision threshold (28), it is possible to obtain the Bayes risk of Blake
(i.e., N = 2) for given beliefs q1, q2. Fig. 3 depicts Blake’s Bayes risk for q1, q2 ∈ [0, 1], and explicitly shows that
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Fig. 3: The Bayes risk for q1, q2 ∈ [0, 1] with p0 = 0.3, c10 = c01 = 1, and additive standard Gaussian noise. The
pair of optimal beliefs (N) yields R2 = 0.2186, while the true prior (•) yields R2 = 0.2214.
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Fig. 4: The trend of the optimal beliefs for varying p0 for N = 2 (Alexis, Blake). Left panel: c10 = c01 = 1, right
panel: c10 = 1, c01 = 3. Z1, Z2 are both standard Gaussian.
knowing true prior probability is not optimal. The social teaching problem with Bayes costs c10 = c01 = 1, prior
p0 = 0.3, and additive Gaussian noise with zero mean and unit variance results in a Bayes risk that is minimum
when Alexis’s belief is 0.38 and Blake’s belief is 0.23, shown in the figure (triangle) and is compared to the true
prior (circle).
Figs. 4 and 5 show the trend of optimal belief pair that minimizes the advisee’s Bayes risk, when all agents have
the same expertise (i.e., same noise levels) for the case of two and three agents respectively. We can observe several
common characteristics. First, the advisors (i.e., non-terminal agents: Alexis for N = 2 and Alexis and Blake for
N = 3) overweight their beliefs if p0 is small and underweight it if p0 is large. We call this open-minded behavior
as it enhances the prior belief of unlikely outcomes. Second, the advisee (i.e., Blake for N = 2 and Chuck for
N = 3) underweights the belief if p0 is small and overweights it if p0 is large, implicitly compensating for the
biases of the advisors. Such behavior is referred to as being closed-minded as it represents a cautious outlook to the
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Fig. 5: The trend of the optimal beliefs for varying p0 for N = 3 (Alexis, Blake, and Chuck). Left panel: c10 =
c01 = 1, right panel: c10 = 1, c01 = 3. Z1, Z2, Z3 are standard Gaussian.
decision-making problem. Lastly, there is a unique, non-trivial prior, p0 ∈ (0, 1), where all agents’ optimal beliefs
are identical to the true prior.
However, the case of diverse expertise of agents results in a very different behavior of optimal beliefs, especially
when the advisee has more expertise. The optimal beliefs for N = 2 and the case of the advisor having more
expertise, and that of the advisee having more expertise respectively are shown in Figs. 6 and 7. As can be
observed, the optimal belief curves are markedly different when the advisee has more expertise, and we now derive
some analytical properties of q∗1 , q
∗
2 .
Theorem 5: For any σ21 and σ
2
2 , q
∗
1 and q
∗
2 satisfy:
1) for p0 ∈ (0, 1), q∗1 ≤ p0 if and only if q∗2 ≥ c01c01+c10 , with equality for q∗2 = c01c01+c10 .
2) p0 = q∗1 = q
∗
2 if and only if p0 ∈
{
0, c01c01+c10 , 1
}
.
Proof: Given in App. A.
Thm. 5 highlights the fact that if the advisee believes the null hypothesis is more likely, then the ideal advisor
underweights the prior, and vice versa. Additionally, for p0 near zero (near one) the optimal advisor overweights
(underweights) the prior.
In particular, let us consider two cases separately. First, let the advisor have more expertise, i.e., σ21 < σ
2
2 . Then
the curves for optimal beliefs and the corresponding Bayes risk are as shown in Fig. 6. The behavior here is similar
to the case with equal expertise, indicating that the additional expertise of the advisor does not alter the overall
behaviors of beliefs, as the advisee is unaware of this improved expertise.
On the other hand, when the advisee has more expertise, i.e., σ21 > σ
2
2 , we notice that the nature of curves
changes, as shown in Fig. 7. The behavior of the ideal agents indicates that when the advisor has significantly
less expertise than the advisee, the advisee stays open-minded. In addition, q∗1 has multiple crossings with p0, i.e.,
q∗2 = c01/(c01 + c10).
As expected, the ideal advisor is open-minded for near-deterministic priors (p0 close to zero or one). However,
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Fig. 6: Optimal beliefs as compared to Prelec-weighted beliefs when the advisor has more expertise.
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Fig. 7: Optimal beliefs as compared to Prelec-weighted beliefs when the advisee has more expertise.
when the prior uncertainty in the hypotheses is high (p0 near 1/2), we note that the ideal advisee with more
expertise favors the less likely hypothesis. This can be attributed to the fact that the advisee stays open-minded to
the less likely hypothesis when the advisor with less expertise is more likely to make errors. To further understand
the nature of such an advisor, we characterize the crossings of the optimal belief curve with the prior q∗1 = p0 .
Theorem 6: The set of all p0 such that q∗1 = p0, q
∗
2 =
c01
c01+c10
is given by the solutions to
ex =
1− βQ(−α+ σ1x)
1− βQ(−α− σ1x) , (29)
where
x = log
(
c10p0
c01(1− p0)
)
, α =
1
2σ1
, β = 1− Q (1/2σ2)
Q (−1/2σ2) .
Proof: Given in App. B.
We note that p∗ = c01c01+c10 is always a solution to (29). The case of multiple solutions to (29) is of particular
interest and a sufficient condition is given in the following corollary.
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in 1 so that the area below it satisfies (30) and therefore has multiple solutions to (29).
Corollary 2: If
2βσ1φ(α)
1− βQ(−α) > 1, (30)
then, (29) has at least 3 solutions in (0, 1).
Proof: Since x is a monotonic function of p0, it is sufficient to show that (29) has at least 3 solutions in x.
From the symmetry in (29), since x = 0 is always a root, it suffices to show the existence of at least one more
root in x > 0. First note the ranges of variables, x ∈ (−∞,∞), α ∈ (0,∞), β ∈ (0, 1).
Letting r(x) be the right side of (29), since 0 ≤ Q(·) ≤ 1, we have
1− β ≤ r(x) := 1− βQ(−α+ σ1x)
1− βQ(−α− σ1x) ≤
1
1− β ,
indicating that r(x) ∈ [1 − β, 11−β ]. However, note that ex monotonically increases in (1,∞) for x > 0. Since
ex, r(x) coincide at x = 0, it follows that they cross at least once on (0,∞) and also on (−∞, 0), if r′(x) > ddxex
at x = 0 by the intermediate value theorem. Thus, the sufficient condition follows:
r′(0) =
2σ1βφ(α; 0, 1)
1− βQ(−α) > 1 =
d
dx
ex
∣∣∣∣∣
x=0
.
Cor. 2 provides a sufficient condition on the expertise of agents under which there exists multiple crossings of the
curves q∗1(p0) and p0. The range of standard deviations of the additive Gaussian noise of the advisor and advisee
that satisfy the sufficient condition of Cor. 2 is shown in Fig. 8. Note from the figure that the area below the red
dotted contour in Fig. 8 has multiple solutions to q∗1 = p0, i.e., when the advisee has comparatively more expertise
than the advisor.
This is important as the crossings indicate a change in the perceived bias of the advisor and also indicates the
regions of in which the advisor overweights the unlikely hypothesis as in Fig. 7.
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A. Approximation by Prelec Family
From Figs. 4, 5, and 6, we observe that the optimal belief curves are similar in form to the Prelec reweighting
functions. Considering the fact that the Prelec reweighting functions represent a mathematical model of human
cognitive biases, one might wonder whether people are (approximately) naturally optimal for social teaching.
To investigate this hypothesis, we approximate the optimal belief curves q∗n by the Prelec function and study
the resulting increase in the Bayes risk. We first restrict to the Prelec family whose fixed point is identical to
p∗ = c10c01+c10 , and then find best parameters (αn, βn) in the minimax absolute error sense, i.e.,
(αn, βn) = arg min
α,β:w(p∗;α,β)=p∗
‖q∗n(·)− w(·;α, β)‖∞.
Let the Prelec function approximations be (q1,Pre, q2,Pre) and let the resulting Bayes risk be R2,Pre.
The Prelec approximations for the two-agent case are shown in dotted curves in Figs. 6 and 7. When the advisor
has more expertise as in Fig. 6, the Prelec function approximates the optimal beliefs well and the Bayes risk does
not increase by much. To evaluate the loss from the approximation, consider the set of correct beliefs q1 = q2 = p0,
that result in a Bayes risk of R2,corr. The maximal loss in terms of Bayes risk from using the correct beliefs is
maxp0(R2,corr − R2,min) ≈ 0.0039. On the other hand, the maximal loss from the best Prelec approximation is
≈ 0.0009. This indicates that the natural cognitive biases of humans are effective for social teaching when the
advisor has more expertise.
On the other hand, when the advisee has more expertise as in Fig. 7, the Prelec approximation does not accurately
mimic the optimal behavior of agents. Recall that the Prelec function is always increasing and has only one crossing
with unit slope line in (0, 1). Therefore, the Prelec function fails to account for all the variations in the optimal
belief. Moreover, while the addtional loss of Bayes risk by the Prelec fitting is ≈ 0.0187, the loss from using
the correct beliefs, p0 = q1 = q2, is ≈ 0.0060. This indicates that even though the Prelec weighting functions
serve as good approximations with expert advisors, they do not model the optimal behavior in the case of poor
advisors. These results suggest that human behavior models originating from cumulative prospect theory [16] are
better-matched to advisors having more expertise rather than less, and in that sense are better suited to function in
the first context.
The result sheds some light on AI-human collaboration frameworks [20]. In many AI-human joint teams, a
human agent makes the final decision based on the advice of an AI component as depicted in Fig. 9a, but the
opposite structure of Fig. 9b is also possible. Considering the fact that the cognitive biases of the human agent are
approximated by the Prelec reweighting functions, the results in this section indicate that an AI assistant with more
expertise could be an effective advisor to the human decision-maker. In particular, an open-minded AI advisor and a
closed-minded human advisee with appropriate Prelec reweighted beliefs function efficiently together, as in Fig. 6.
However, an AI component with less expertise might not prove to be a good advisor to the human advisee who
does not have beliefs that mimic the optimal behavior in Fig. 7 and so perhaps counterintuitively, the architecture
of Fig. 9b should be adopted, with the AI agent having less expertise making the global decision.
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Fig. 9: Models of AI-human collaboration, where a machine provides input for human judgement or vice versa.
VI. TEAM CONSTRUCTION CRITERION
Having studied the mathematical conditions for optimal reweighting of prior probabilities, we now investigate
team selection for social learning. Naturally, a social planner who is aware of the context p0 can pick the optimal
agent pairs to minimize Bayes risk. However, it is not clear if agents are capable of organizing themselves into
ideal teams in the absence of contextual knowledge. Thus, we now identify the criterion for the advisee to identify
the optimal advisors among a set of given advisors.
Theorem 7: Consider two advisors with q1 < q1′ . Let λ1, λ1′ be the decision thresholds of the respective advisors.
Then, the advisor with belief q1 is the optimal choice if and only if
P1
[
Y1 ∈ [λ1, λ1′ ], Y2 ∈ [λ12, λ02]
]
P0 [Y1 ∈ [λ1, λ1′ ], Y2 ∈ [λ12, λ02]]
≥ c10p0
c01(1− p0) . (31)
Proof: Given in App. C.
In other words, by rewriting (31) in a likelihood ratio form, we observe that the criterion for picking the advisor
with smaller belief is given by the likelihood ratio test
L
[
Ĥ1 = Ĥ2 = 1, Ĥ1′ = Ĥ2′ = 0
]
≥ c10p0
c01(1− p0) ,
where Ĥ2′ is the decision made by the advisee following the decision of the advisor with belief q1′ .
Thus selecting an ideal advisor requires a social planner who is aware of the context p0. Without this, the advisee
selects an advisor according to his personal belief q2. That is, the advisee verifies condition (31) by replacing p0
by q2. Such a choice of advisor might not always conform to the optimal choice when the belief of the advisee
deviates significantly from the prior. To illustrate, we consider the problem of choosing between two advisors with
beliefs q1(p0) = q∗1(p0) and q1′(p0) = p0. Let q(p0, q2) be the belief of the optimal advisor choice for a given pair
(p0, q2). We identify the region of correct selection by shading, S = {(p0, q2) : q(p0, q2) = q(q2, q2)}.
First, when expertise levels are equal, the region in which the advisee picks the correct advisor is shown in
Fig. 10a. We note that the correct region is relatively small and does not include q∗2 . In particular, the advisee with
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Fig. 10: Context-unaware team selection.
optimal belief chooses the wrong advisor always, whereas a suboptimal advisee with beliefs in the shaded region
picks the correct one.
On the other hand, when the advisee has more expertise than the advisor, the corresponding region is as shown
in Fig. 10b. Here we note that the advisee with optimal belief picks the correct advisor always.
Thus, we note that knowledge of the mathematically optimal beliefs does not guarantee selection of the right
advisor. Further, we also observe that the diversity of expertise levels may increase the feasibility of selecting the
right advisor when the advisee has optimal belief.
We also explore the optimal choice of advisor for the given optimal advisee in the absence of knowledge of the
prior probability. From (25), the belief of the optimal advisor, q˜1 chosen by an advisee, in the absence of context
(prior probability p0) satisfies
q˜1
1− q˜1 =
p0
1− p0
P I1e,2 − P I0e,2
P II0e,2 − P II1e,2
. (32)
The advisee’s behavior with belief q∗2 is as shown in Fig. 10c. We note that the advisor chosen by the advisee
differs from the optimal choice. Further, it is also evident that this choice consequently results in an increased Bayes
risk. Such behavior in team selection highlights the significance of context and thus a social planner for identifying
the right team.
The result again provides some insight into human-AI collaborations when the human agent picks an AI advisor,
given a choice among different agents. In particular, consider the AI-human team where the human, who has a
Prelec-weighted belief, chooses one of two possible AI advisors—one that has the optimal belief q∗1 and the other
that is aware of the true prior p0. In case the human agent has lesser expertise, and a closed-minded Prelec belief as
in Fig. 10a, she unfortunately picks the AI advisor with q1 = p0 and the team becomes suboptimal. However, if the
human agent has more expertise, and an open-minded Prelec belief, she picks the optimal AI component q1 = q∗1
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and therefore can make the optimal decision as in Fig. 10b. Thus it is evident that optimal team organization is
feasible when the human has more expertise and the appropriate open-minded belief.
VII. CONCLUSION
We discussed the sequential social learning problem with individual biased beliefs. Unlike previous works on
herding, we focused on the Bayes risk of the last-acting agent. We first derived the optimal belief update rule for
general likelihoods and evaluated for Gaussian likelihoods. Counterintuitively, optimal beliefs that yield minimum
Bayes risk are in general different from the true prior. Under equal expertise levels, we observed that optimal
advisors have open-minded beliefs, that is, overweight small priors and underweight large priors, while the optimal
advisee has closed-minded belief. However, the trend may change depending on varying expertise levels such that
especially when the advisee has much more expertise, optimal belief of the advisee is inverted as she becomes
open-minded.
We also showed that the Prelec reweighting function from cumulative prospect theory approximates the behavior
of the optimal beliefs under specific levels of expertise, however, when the advisee has much more expertise, it
fails to capture all the behavioral traits of the optimal beliefs.
Finally, we considered the ability of agents to organize themselves into optimal teams and showed that in the
absence of a social planner, the advisee can get paired with the wrong advisor when the individual belief deviates
significantly from the underlying prior value. The setup arises from the consideration of AI and it tells us without
knowing the true prior, our human-machine team construction could be misorganized.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
Let us prove Thm. 5 starting with the premise that q∗1 ≥ p0. First, from (25), we have
q∗1 ≥ p0 ⇐⇒
P II1e,2 − P II0e,2
P I1e,2 − P I0e,2
≥ −1. (33)
To study the ratio in (33), consider the Type I vs. Type II error curve for binary hypothesis testing under additive
Gaussian noise.3 This is shown in Fig. 11, and as seen here is a convex function [25]. Note that on the curve, the
Type I and Type II error probabilities, (P Ie, P
II
e ), are the points on the curve that have tangents with slope matching
−
(
c10q
c01(1−q)
)
, where q is the corresponding prior probability, and σ2 is the variance of the additive Gaussian noise.
First, from Thm. 2, we know that q02 ≥ q12 which in turn implies that λ02 ≥ λ12. This in turn indicates that
P I0e,2 = Q
(
λ02
σ2
)
≤ Q
(
λ12
σ2
)
= P I1e,2.
Similarly, P II0e,2 ≥ P II1e,2, and thus, as shown in the figure, the point B0 =
(
P I0e,2, P
II0
e,2
)
lies to the left of B1 =(
P I1e,2, P
II1
e,2
)
.
Further, since B1 lies on the curve, so does the point B¯1 =
(
P II1e,2, P
I1
e,2
)
as it caters to the error probabilities
corresponding to the probability of the null hypothesis PH = 0 = 1− q12 . Thus, the line B1B¯1 has a slope of −1.
3It is also called Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve [25], [26] when the curve is vertically inverted.
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Fig. 11: The point B0 always exists between points B1 and B¯1.
Note that the condition (33) translates to the slope of the line B0B1 is greater than −1. Observe that if B¯1 lies
to the right of B1 then it implies that the slope of B0B1 is less than −1, violating (33). Similarly, if B0 lies to the
left of B¯1, then again the (33) is violated.
On the other hand, if B0 lies between B¯1 and B1, then we know that the slope of B0B1 is greater than that of
B1B¯1, therein satisfying (33). Thus, (33) is true if and only if the point B0 lies between the two points B1 and
B¯1.
From the convexity of the curve and comparing coordinates of B0 and B¯1, we have
q∗1 ≥ p0 ⇐⇒ P I0e,2 ≥ P II1e,2 and P II0e,2 ≤ P I1e,2
(a)⇐⇒ Q
(
λ02
σ2
)
≥ 1−Q
(
λ12 − 1
σ2
)
and Q
(
λ12
σ2
)
≥ 1−Q
(
λ02 − 1
σ2
)
(b)⇐⇒ λ02 + λ12 ≤ 1
(c)⇐⇒ 2λ1,[2] + σ22 log
P Ie,1,[2]
(
1− P Ie,1,[2]
)
P IIe,1,[2]
(
1− P IIe,1,[2]
)
 ≤ 1, (34)
where (a) follows from the false alarm and missed detection probabilities in terms of the Q-function of the standard
Gaussian random variable; (b) follows from the fact that the Q-function is monotonically decreasing and that
1−Q(x) = Q(−x); and (c) follows from (22), (23), and λ1,[2] = λ2(q2).
From (28), we have
λ1,[2] =
1
2
+ σ22 log
(
c10q
∗
2
c01(1− q∗2)
)
.
Substituting in (34), we have
q∗1 ≥ p0 ⇐⇒ 2 log
(
c10q
∗
2
c01(1− q∗2)
)
≤ log
P IIe,1,[2]
(
1− P IIe,1,[2]
)
P Ie,1,[2]
(
1− P Ie,1,[2]
)
 .
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Letting x := log
(
c10q
∗
2
c01(1−q∗2 )
)
= 1
σ22
(
λ2 − 12
)
and using Q(·) representation of error probabilities, we have
q∗1 ≥ p0 ⇐⇒ 2x ≤ log
Q
(
σ2x− 12σ2
)
Q
(
−σ2x+ 12σ2
)
Q
(
σ2x+
1
2σ2
)
Q
(
−σ2x− 12σ2
)
 . (35)
From Cor. 1, we know that the function
g˜(x) = x+ log
(
Q
(
σx+ 12σ
)
Q
(
σx− 12σ
))
is an increasing function of x. Thus, reformulating (35) using g˜(·),
q∗1 ≥ p0 ⇐⇒ g˜(x) ≤ g˜(−x)
⇐⇒ x ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ q∗2 ≤
c01
c01 + c10
.
The condition for equality follows from observing the condition for equality at all the inequalities, proving the first
part of the result.
The second part follows directly from the first, taking into account the trivial cases of p0 ∈ {0, 1}.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 6
We will consider the case of c01 = c10 = 1 for convenience. The proof extends directly by a simple scaling
argument.
The optimal belief of worker two satisfies ∂R2∂q2 = 0. Thus, differentiating (24) with respect to q2 and rearranging,
p0
[
(1− P Ie,1)fY2|H(λ02|0)
∂λ02
∂q2
+ P Ie,1fY2|H(λ
1
2|0)
∂λ12
∂q2
]
=
(1− p0)
[
P IIe,1fY2|H(λ
0
2|1)
∂λ02
∂q2
+ (1− P IIe,1)fY2|H(λ12|1)
∂λ12
∂q2
]
.
Let x = log
(
p0
1−p0
)
. For q∗2 = 1/2 and q
∗
1 = p0, we have
λ1 =
1
2
+ σ21x and λ1,[2] =
1
2
.
It implies P Ie,1,[2] = P
II
e,1,[2] = Q(1/2σ2). Then,
L(λ02) =
fY2|H(λ
0
2|1)
fY2|H(λ
0
2|0)
=
q2
1− q2
(1− P Ie,1,[2])
P IIe,1,[2]
=
Q(−1/2σ2)
Q(1/2σ2)
=:
1
c
,
L(λ12) =
fY2|H(λ
1
2|1)
fY2|H(λ
1
2|0)
=
q2
1− q2
P Ie,1,[2]
(1− P IIe,1,[2])
=
Q(1/2σ2)
Q(−1/2σ2) = c.
Equivalently, this implies that
λ02 =
1
2
+ σ2 log
(
1
c
)
, λ12 =
1
2
− σ2 log
(
1
c
)
.
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Thus, λ02 + λ
1
2 = 1, and so,
fY2|H(λ
1
2|1) =
1√
2piσ2
exp
(
− (λ12−1)2
2σ22
)
=
1√
2piσ2
exp
(
− (λ02)2
2σ22
)
= fY2|H(λ
0
2|0).
Similarly, we also have
fY2|H(λ
1
2|0) = fY2|H(λ02|1).
Further, from (22) and (23), we have
dλ02
dq2
=
dλ02
dλ1,[2]
dλ1,[2]
dq2
=
1 + σ22φ
(
λ1,[2]
σ2
)
1− P Ie,1,[2]
−
σ22φ
(
λ1,[2]−1
σ2
)
P IIe,1,[2]
 dλ1,[2]
dq2
,
dλ12
dq2
=
dλ12
dλ1,[2]
dλ1,[2]
dq2
=
1− σ22φ
(
λ1,[2]
σ2
)
P Ie,1,[2]
+
σ22φ
(
λ1,[2]−1
σ2
)
1− P IIe,1,[2]
 dλ1,[2]
dq2
.
When, λ1,[2] = 12 , P
I
e,1,[2] = P
II
e,1,[2] = Q
(
1
2σ2
)
, and φ
(
λ1,[2]
σ2
)
= φ
(
λ1,[2]−1
σ2
)
. Thus, dλ
0
2
dq2
=
dλ12
dq2
.
Using these, the values of prior for which q∗1 = p0, q
∗
2 = 1/2 are given by
p0
1− p0 =
Q
(
−1
2σ2
)
Q
(
−1
2σ1
− σ1x
)
+Q
(
1
2σ2
)
Q
(
1
2σ1
+ σ1x
)
Q
(
−1
2σ2
)
Q
(
−1
2σ2
+ σ1x
)
+Q
(
1
2σ2
)
Q
(
1
2σ1
− σ1x
) . (36)
Using the definitions of x, α, β in (36), and the fact that Q(−y) = 1−Q(y), the result follows.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 7
From (1), we note that the Bayes risk for social learning with beliefs (q1, q2) is
R2(q1, q2) = c10p0
[
P I0e,2(1− P Ie,1) + P I1e,2P Ie,1
]
+ c01(1− p0)
[
P II0e,2P
II
e,1 + P
II1
e,2(1− P IIe,1)
]
.
Then, the difference in Bayes risk between the two choices of advisors is given by
∆R2 = R2(q1, q2)−R2(q1′ , q2)
= c10p0(P
I
e,1 − P Ie,1′)(P I1e,2 − P I0e,2) + c01(1− p0)(P IIe,1 − P IIe,1′)(P II0e,2 − P II1e,2). (37)
Since q1 < q1′ , the decision thresholds satisfy λ1 < λ1′ . Thus, from (37) and independence of Y1, Y2 given H ,
we see that ∆R2 ≤ 0 if and only if (31) holds.
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